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From Dirigisme to Realism: 
Chinese Industrial Policy in the Era of Globalisation 
Jean-François Huchet 
Professor, INALCO-Langues'O, Sorbonne Paris Cité 
 
 
The 2012 "Fortune 500" classification of the world’s largest companies includes 73 Chinese 
firms (32 for France and 68 for Japan), whereas there were none only 15 years ago.1 
Meanwhile, Chinese firms are increasing their overseas operations with nearly $60 billion of 
foreign direct investment per year, on average since 2008, compared to less than $1 billion 
annually before 2000. Fifteen years ago, Chinese exports were mainly composed of primary 
products and goods with a low technological content. Today they are rapidly concentrating on 
products in the information industry. Research and development (R & D), which was totally 
lifeless in the early 1980s, has also experienced brisk development since the late 1990s: China 
is now the world's second largest publisher in scientific journals and ninth in the number of 
patents filed in the United States in 2009.2 
These signs of the emergence of China's industrial power raise a number of questions in the 
fields of economics and industrial policy, as well as in growth theory (Huchet, 2010). After 
the Japanese and Korean miracles, the temptation is indeed very strong to apply to China – the 
civilisation at the origin of the Confucian political and cultural basis of Asia – explanations 
related to the omnipotence of the State and the effectiveness of industrial policy (Johnson, 
1982). What is really the truth? Has China followed the virtuous industrial policy footsteps of 
its Asian neighbours? What have been the terms of the industrial policy since 1978 and what 
effect has it had on China’s economic takeoff? What directions might industrial policy take in 
the coming years, given the context of the increasing openness of China’s economy? This 
paper aims to provide some answers to these questions. 
Section 1 recalls some aspects of the historical legacy of the period before 1978, as well as 
some features of the first steps to economic reform in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These 
had a major influence on the objectives, the strategy and the efficiency of Chinese industrial 
policy. The second section presents the main outlines of China’s industrial policy until the late 
1990s, focusing primarily on the policy of creating "national champions", and the 
rationalisation of industrial structures, as well as on the development of the technological 
capabilities of firms. Industrial policy during this period was often characterised by excessive 
ambitions, given the mode of socialist institutions and businesses, along with the chronic 
underdevelopment of human and financial resources that plagued China until the mid-1990s. 
Policies launched during this period were largely imbued with socialist planning. They led to 
mixed results depending on the sector, but were often disappointing in terms of objectives. 
Other elements of the reform policy during this period which were not, strictly speaking, 
industrial policy, did in fact help transform corporate behaviour and the functioning of 
institutions, to increase the financial and human resources available. Finally, Section 3 looks 
at the transition from dirigisme to realism in the second half of the 1990s. This development 
																																								 																				
1 http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2012/countries/China.html?iid=smlrr, consulted  
31 August 2012. 
2 Royal Society, Knowledge, Networks and Nations: Global scientific collaboration in the 21st century, Royal 
Society Policy document, March 2011, 114 pp.	
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occurred within an economic context that was generally much more favourable than in the 
1980s. The improved tax situation allowed the Chinese government to have the financial 
means to launch credible and ambitious industrial policies. Institutions, including ministries, 
commissions, and agencies were restructured, while the vestiges of planning were cleared 
away. The State industrial sector was also significantly restructured, through privatisations, 
mergers, layoffs and employment along with social protection reforms which shattered the 
"iron rice bowl" that the socialist leaders had not dared to attack in the 1980s.3 Finally, the 
massive investments made in the 1990s in the educational system of large cities and in 
infrastructure also contributed to improving the design and conduct of industrial policy. The 
less proactive industrial policy of the 2000s also diversified, both in terms of means and 
targets, aiming to provide support to the private sector and small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). These businesses had been totally ignored during the first period. 
 
1 - The Historical Legacy of Industrial Policy  
Despite the profound break in the economic development strategy that occurred when Deng 
Xiaoping seized power in December 1978, Chinese policy-makers remained firmly focussed 
into the mid-1990s on a vision of industrial development policy that was inward and planned. 
It is useful to recall some historical facts and aspects of the early stages of economic reform, 
which had a major influence on the content and evolution of Chinese industrial policy during 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
1.1 The weight of History 
Generally speaking, China's industrial policy has been influenced by four major events in the 
history of modern and contemporary China: 
• A sense of humiliation and theft of its rank as a great millennial power in the face of Europe, 
the United States, and Japan which all forced China to sign unequal treaties. This has led to a 
strong will to find a prominent place on the world stage. 
• The observation made in the late 1970s by Chinese leaders of its growing economic and 
technological backwardness with respect to China’s Asian neighbours. Economic success is 
analysed as the result of proactive action by the State, within a capitalist system. 
• A deeply rooted belief in the omnipotence of the State and its capacity to intervene 
following the combined influence of the "celestial bureaucracy" of imperial China and the 
assimilation of the Soviet planning model. 
• Management of the policy favouring population growth promoted by Mao Zedong in the late 
1950s. Despite a slowdown in the birth rate in the early 1970s, this policy resulted in a 
doubling of the population between 1958 and 1980 (when China's population exceeded one 
billion individuals) and the influx of young people (near 15 million per year) on the labour 
market in the late 1970s. The spectre of widespread unemployment that could undermine 
social stability and thus the communist regime has strongly guided the choice of the Chinese 
leadership, both at central and local levels. The communist State adopted a laissez-faire 
approach and tolerance for the proliferation of public and private companies which are under-
capitalised and poorly innovative, but able to absorb this huge "industrial reserve army". 
																																								 																				
3 The “iron rice bowl” refers to a system of lifetime employment, free housing and basic social protection which 
prevailed in State enterprises and municipalities.  
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These four major factors in the history of modern and contemporary China have strongly 
conditioned the ambitions, the nature, objectives and results of the industrial policy pursued 
by the State over the last thirty years. 
 
1.2 The Maoist legacy 
China took a great step in 1978 in terms of re-designing its industrial development strategy. 
Few countries, even in the communist camp, had been so cut off from the rest of the world, 
having experienced political movements such as the "Great Leap Forward" (1958-1961) and 
the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), which were devastating to its economic organisation. 
The industrial development strategy in the Maoist era was based on an essentially 
functionalist view of the economic system. Unlike the Soviet model, which favoured large 
production units, China’s strategy was also concerned with local autonomy in production. 
Each government department had its own companies, each province, even each municipality 
had to adopt as complete a production system as possible. The period during which so-called 
"Third Front" companies were set up in interior provinces (1964 and 1973) only reinforced 
this dispersion phenomenon and the duplication of investments. Political movements 
orchestrated by Mao's Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution deeply destabilised 
the Soviet-style system of central planning China introduced between 1953 and 1958. The 
implementation of such Soviet planning was stopped at the institutional level between 1958 
and 1978: no five-year plan reached its objectives during this period (Riskin, 1987). In 1990, 
just months after the Berlin Wall had fallen, 52,000 products were still being managed by 
central planning in Moscow, at the USSR’s Gosplan. In China, in 1978, only 700 products 
were managed centrally, by the State Planning Commission in Beijing (Naughton, 1995). 
The Maoist strategy led to a prioritisation of industry subject to the planning level of 
production. Production units existed that were directly supervised by central government 
(Zhongyang shu), while other units were dependent on provincial or municipal governments 
(Difang shu). Naturally, companies that were under direct management by central government 
benefited from its logistical support. These large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were 
considered as China’s "industrial backbone" (Gugan qiye), while the projects they developed 
were the so-called "key points" (zhongdian) of the five-year and annual plans. They received 
priority support financially and materially (access to raw materials and procurement) from 
central government. For these companies, planning was also developed in the USSR. Their 
numbers grew throughout the 1960s, then levelled off during the 1970s and 1980s at around 
10,000. But they never dominated the entire economy, as in the USSR. 
Planning did not play such an important role for businesses managed at the provincial level. 
The allocation of inputs was not organised centrally. At most, planning was undertaken in 
aggregate terms, province by province, with industrial provincial offices subsequently taking 
responsibility for ensuring a more precise allocation for each company. Most often this 
allocation of resources was organised at the provincial or municipal level. However, planning 
was far from covering all the activities conducted by firms in this category. Companies in 
search of inputs, and marketing their outputs were taken to develop horizontal relationships 
with other companies. These horizontal relations were in barter, not monetary form (Granick, 
1990). The majority of these companies were taxed as "3/80" (San Ba): the provincial 
government allocated 80% of the necessary inputs, 80% of specified material, and 80% of the 
resources needed to purchase equipment. Mao bequeathed an industrial organisation which 
superimposed two systems: a planned and centralised Soviet-style system for a few large 
companies that provided only 30% of total industrial output (compared to 74% in the USSR), 
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and a myriad of economic systems compartmentalised at the local level and characterised by a 
"semi-planning and semi-anarchy" (Granick, 1990). 
 
1.3 Change and continuity until the mid-1990s 
Until the mid-1980s, the communist leaders tried repair the aberrations in the management of 
the economic system put in place under the influence of Mao between 1958 and 1976, instead 
of introducing a market economy. Policies aimed to depoliticise economic life, to demilitarise 
company management and management by ministries, and to restore central planning, which 
had been largely discontinued. The authorities were locked in a dialectic process they could 
not get out of: they had to pursue reform both to correct the contradictions of existing reforms 
which could destabilise them, but which also held out the promise of generating growth to 
maintain a minimum of political legitimacy among the population. With each wave of 
reforms, the deregulation of the economy (and thus the parallel freedom of individuals and 
firms in the economy) gained increasing scope. But it was not until the bloody episode of 
Tiananmen in 1989 and the attempts to return to economic socialism by the conservative wing 
of the CCP were overcome, that the 14th Congress of the CCP in October 1992 was able to set 
aside the political, intellectual, economic barriers for lack of a possible alternative, and that 
the market economy was clearly adopted in the policy reforms of the economic system. 
There was therefore a clear turning-point in the late 1970s, which was primarily aimed at a 
return to socialist normality, and peripherally, elements of reforms to make the socialist 
system more flexible, such as the opening of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in southern 
China, the dismantling of People's Communes, and the opportunity to develop collective 
enterprises in rural areas. These ‘peripheral’ reforms proved to be the essential dynamics of 
the revival of Chinese industry. Yet they took place in indirect ways and often in a manner not 
anticipated by the regime. 
A chronological analysis of Chinese industrial policy makes it possible to distinguish two 
periods clearly enough. The first lasted nearly 20 years, from 1978 to mid-1990. This period 
was marked by strong interventionism and inordinate ambitions in terms of the financial and 
human resources which China had. Furthermore, objectives were carried out in the framework 
of an economy still largely operating within a planned system. The second period began in the 
mid-1990s and was marked by greater realism, as well as an improvement in the design and 
implementation of industrial policy in China.  
 
2. The Era of Dirigisme 
During the first period from 1978 to the mid-1990s, industrial policy focused on three main 
priorities: i) the creation of large national industrial groups; ii) the assimilation of imported 
technology from abroad, and; iii) reform of the national system of research and development 
(R & D). The general principles underlying this policy, the strategy to achieve the objectives, 
the types of companies covered by the industrial policy, and the means implemented were still 
largely rooted in socialism and the functioning of a planned economy:  
 - During this period, the principles were still based on a functional, productivist and 
centralised vision of the economy. 
- The strategy adopted by the Chinese government was very proactive. The State was the 
centre of all decisions and directly intervened in companies via the transmission belt of public 
ownership and planning. 
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- Firms receiving state aid were all large SOEs, the so-called “backbone” of the industrial 
system (gugan qiye). Small and medium enterprises, let alone those that would grow out of 
the state sector, were completely ignored by industrial policy. 
- Industrial policy was largely controlled by the powerful the State Planning Commission and 
central ministries that oversaw various industrial sectors. They determined the priority sectors 
and firms, and the volume of investments within the framework of five-year plans. 
- The financial, administrative and human resources used to carry out policies were both weak 
and disassociated from planning. 
- Finally, the objectives put forward by the Chinese government in the context of industrial 
policy were quite ambitious: technological catch-up in areas in which China had lagged for 
decades behind the technological frontier; the creation of large industrial groups capable of 
entering the small world of the "Fortune 500" classification; strong integration of industrial 
production throughout the country to reduce imports; and the autonomy and empowerment of 
scientific and technological production (Conroy, 1992). 
 
2.1. The ambitions of China’s planners 
The policy of creating industrial groups and the rationalisation of China’s industrial 
structure 
Chinese leaders have been strongly influenced by the experiences of Japan (with its Kereitsu), 
France (nationalisation and national champions) and Korea (Chaebols), countries in which the 
State has played a more or less direct, but no less important role in the formation of major 
national industrial groups capable of generating cutting-edge technologies, and projecting 
economic power beyond their borders. In the detailed analysis of the late industrialisation of 
Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, the presence of large industrial groups with a 
multinational vocation has been viewed by Chinese leaders as the main reason for the speed 
of development and of the industrial dynamism of their virtuous Asian neighbours. In Chinese 
rhetoric, such groups were then exhorted to become the "national army" (guojia dui) 
representing China abroad, while being industry leaders at the national level (zhuli jun). These 
enterprises appeared as the key to solving all problems and structural deficiencies of Chinese 
industry. Their role was to break down barriers both geographically (business combines in 
different regions), but also in terms of ministerial dependencies (business combines linked to 
different government entities). 
Consolidation was to occur around a few large state enterprises and progressively lead to the 
creation of increasingly important financial and technological synergies. The context in which 
these national experiences took place (a market economy that was competitive at the national 
level, the decision-making autonomy of companies) was largely concealed by the designers of 
China’s industrial policy. Only the very proactive and interventionist dimension of 
government policy was put forward, which overestimated the ability of the State to create 
industrial groups able to withstand international competition. 
The Chinese authorities have sought to rationalise the industrial structure of the country. The 
policy of regional self-sufficiency, along with Mao’s dictum of "relying on one’s own 
strength", which he promoted from late 1950s until his death, resulted in the duplication of 
investments in thousands of small production units. These were under-capitalised and 
incapable of generating economies of scale. The proliferation of small SOEs was most 
widespread in the cement, fertiliser, steel, and electricity generation industries. For example, it 
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is estimated that there were nearly 500 companies producing steel in the late 1970s (Perkins, 
1991). The policy of decentralizing investment authorisations, taxation and bank finance 
launched by Deng Xiaoping in the early reforms further aggravated this fragmentation of 
industrial structures. The negative impact of such fragmentation of industrial structures 
became apparent: over-production in virtually all sectors of the industry (hence low capacity 
utilisation), very low, or even with no returns on investment, the waste of savings, and initial 
signs of negative consequences for the banking in terms of bad loans. 
The management of technology transfers 
As for technological progress, the strategy of self-sufficiency (zili gengsheng) remained the 
rule. The decision to allow foreign direct investment (FDI) in four "special economic zones" 
(SEZs) in southern China, quickly spread to 14 large cities and 256 districts. But it did not call 
into question the principle of “import substitution”, which remained at the heart of the 
Chinese State’s technology policy. The FDI Act in 1979 was a turning point, compared to the 
previous period when some "turnkey" plants were imported without foreign capital. For the 
first time since 1949, the FDI Act allowed foreign capital to enter Chinese soil. Such foreign 
capital was only allowed into re-export activities and into some key sectors (the automotive, 
nuclear, telephone and integrated circuit industries) that Chinese companies were unable to 
master. FDI had to be in joint ventures, in which the foreign partner could not hold a majority 
stake. 
Re-export activities, by foreign-owned companies producing in China, mainly in SEZs and 
coastal towns, were not in direct competition with the large state enterprises, as they did not 
have the right to sell into the domestic market. For investments in the so-called priority 
sectors (the list was changed periodically), the FDI Act was designed to ensure a maximum 
transfer of foreign technology to ensure import substitution. Joint ventures (JVs) were subject 
to a set of rules on the degree of foreign technological innovation transferred, and the rate of 
local integration into production. This had to rise over time to help create Chinese suppliers of 
components and spare parts. Furthermore, the Act required joint ventures to transfer (after 
several years) their knowledge to their Chinese partners in the JV (generally, large SOEs), so 
the latter could become more independent in terms of technology. 
Reform of the national R & D system 
The national R & D system before 1978 was largely modelled along Soviet lines until the 
Cultural Revolution, and practically disintegrated for nearly ten years thereafter. The system 
suffered the weaknesses of the Soviet model: a partitioning of R & D performed in public 
laboratories (many of which were for military purposes) vis-à-vis industry, the waste of scarce 
human and financial resources, bureaucratic excesses in the planning of innovation, very low 
efficiency in its contribution to the production of cost-effective technologies. 
As of 1985, the central planners sought to boost the R & D system through a series of 
reforms. These are aimed at selecting public research institutions according to their excellence 
and opening up the R & D system by bringing together the productive sphere of the research. 
With the exception of laboratories of excellence, research institutions have been gradually led 
out of dependency on state subsidies, which previously funded the entire R & D system. 
Despite the existence of a strong commitment in central government, the establishment of 
industrial policy very quickly ran into the practical functioning of the Chinese economy. In 
the late 1990s, nearly two decades after the launch of these three priority programs, the results 
were fairly mixed, even disappointing in terms of objectives. However, some more general 
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reforms related to deregulation of the economy did have a positive impact on the operation of 
Chinese enterprises. 
 
2.2. Failures and surprises in the policy of creating industrial groups and the rationalisation of 
industrial structure 
The failure of administrative logic in the creation of "national champions" 
At the end of 1989, Chinese industry had 1,630 industrial groups that had been set up 
following authorisation by central and local government.4 The industrial groups formed 
during the 1980s existed only on paper. They had no internal structure likely to lead to 
technical and financial complementarities following from concentration. Analyses very 
quickly pointed to three operating characteristics of the socialist Chinese economy as the main 
sources of problems in the creation of industrial groups: i) the system of public ownership, ii) 
the administrative dependency of companies vis-à-vis local governments, and iii) the fiscal 
and monetary systems. The majority of consolidations into groups were conducted in an 
authoritarian manner by municipal governments, through administrative edicts forcing local 
companies in the same industry to merge. These mergers were often obtained to hide losses in 
some firms by linking them to other businesses in better financial health. An inter-sectoral 
coordination effort was made in the early 1990s (again at the municipal level), with local 
boards of management of State assets being set up in haste in major Chinese cities which were 
meant to conduct the local industrial policy. Despite this, the groups did not reflect the needs 
or strategies of their component businesses, which had to comply with the orders of the local 
authorities. It was also difficult, if not impossible, to create groups which crossed the 
territorial jurisdiction of a municipality or province. The payment of taxes, the management of 
earnings, the authorisation of investment finance, the appointment of directors and company 
management, all depended on local government, which exercised the right of ownership 
delegated to it by the central government in Beijing. As the groups were sources of tax 
revenue, patronage, and political prestige, no local government wanted to forego the benefits 
which ownership of such public companies provided. However, the vast majority of these 
groups were unable to deploy the financial, technological and business synergies for which 
they had been created, so that they remained mostly a collection of independent production 
units (Jian Yiwei, 1990). 
Concerning the rationalisation of industrial structures, the policies launched by the central 
government produced meagre results. Thousands of under-sized producers, making the same 
products, were spread across the country: there were 8,000 independent producers of cement, 
compared to an estimated 1,500 worldwide; 123 automobile producers; 1,500 steel plants. An 
analysis of concentration ratios based on the census of industrial enterprises (conducted in 
1995) showed there had been no positive developments in this area. Among the 25 major 
industrial sectors (despite contrasting trends by industry), the market shares of the top eight 
companies increased only in very small proportions, from 11.7% to 12.2% between 1990 and 
1996. The 1995 census of industrial companies also showed an extremely low production 
utilisation rate in the 43 sectors surveyed: only four sectors recorded a capacity utilisation rate 
of 60%. In 1994, 500 Chinese groups accounted for only 16% of GDP, much lower than in 
industrialised countries, where the top-500 companies generally represent at least 30% of 
GDP. 
																																								 																				
4 In Zhongguo Qiye Guanli Nianjian, (Directory of management of Chinese companies), Zhongguo Qiye Guanli 
Xiehui, Beijing, 1990, p. 305. 
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Decentralisation: an engine of growth and a brake on concentration 
The difficulties encountered by the central government in streamlining industrial structures 
were largely due to the significant level of decentralisation of decision-making within the 
administration concerning investment.  
This decentralisation took place with the background of the Maoist legacy that, for ideological 
and military reasons, had sought the fragmentation of the production. The political and 
economic environment in which decentralisation took place in the 1980s had evolved. On the 
one hand, large state enterprises remained within the system of centralised socialist planning 
at the national level, albeit with some management autonomy relating to daily business. They 
continued to have priority support from the central government for their financial needs, as 
well as access to raw materials and human resources, while representing the main source of 
tax revenue of the central government. On the other hand, for small and medium-sized SOEs 
controlled by central government or local authorities, China’s leadership felt it was unrealistic 
to integrate them into a centrally-managed apparatus. Subsequently, decentralisation has 
profoundly changed the incentive system of local management, given changes in the business 
environment, including the increasing monetisation of the economy, particularly through the 
development of bank financing, the growth of tax revenues of local governments and a liberal 
political environment conducive to growth and personal enrichment which was advocated by 
Deng Xiaoping (S. Shirk, 1993). Local officials could henceforth participate actively in local 
economic development, accelerate their careers in the hierarchy of the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) on the basis of purely economic criteria, develop local patronage, and enrich 
themselves by marketing their decision-making authority and by participating indirectly in the 
creation of new businesses. 
Changes in the incentive system for managers, their grip on local bank financing channels 
(mainly through the appointment of branch managers in state commercial banks) led to fast 
growth in start-ups and investments. Entrepreneurship not only affected the collective and 
private sectors. In rural areas, start-ups were carried out under the status of collective 
ownership (more flexible and vague to the point of being qualified as hybrid).5 In cities, the 
state sector continued to grow rapidly (from 65,000 to nearly 126,000 industrial enterprises in 
1996) and remained by far the largest employer in industry, in the mid-1990s.6 This 
movement to create state-owned enterprises in the industrial sector took place at a time when 
bankruptcies were non-existent and when the constraints to repay bank loans for public firms 
were almost zero. It is easy to understand why the policy of creating groups and rationalising 
industry largely failed. Paradoxically, this sustained creation of companies along with its 
attendant chronic over-production would lead to the emergence of competition in some 
industries and produce unexpected results regarding the emergence of China’s industrial 
groups. 
 
Competition and the emergence of new "national champions" 
In this context of the proliferation of companies and overproduction, competition gradually 
developed in the late 1980s in several sectors, such as light industry, building materials, the 
automotive industry, textiles and chemicals. The downturns in the economy between 1989 
																																								 																				
5 Local governments were owners of companies in towns and counties, so their management was very largely 
privatised (Victor Nee, 1992). 
6 Zhongguo tongji nianjian (China Statistical Abstract), 1997. 
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and 1991, and between 1994 and 1998 heightened competition between firms, within an 
environment of chronic overproduction. With the exception of a few areas that were still 
monopolistic or regulated (like the electricity and oil industries), companies had to fight to 
win customers and market share, from this time onwards. 
One of the paradoxical and unexpected effects of decentralisation for Chinese industrial 
policy-makers was the advent of large industrial dynamic firms of a new type, controlled by 
the State, and which were able to use the competition to their advantage. As of the early 
1990s, some companies which had not been among the best-known and most-favoured by the 
State during the 1980s, launched price wars, improvements in product quality and after-sales 
services. They also aggressively development of their distribution networks across the 
country. This strategy triggered a virtuous cycle as they increased their market share, and 
economies of scale, helping to raise profits, which were then assigned to new investment in 
new products or to improve quality. These firms have built up their reputations on strategies 
that do not differ from those of large firms in capitalist economies. It should be emphasised 
that these firms were not included in the list of “national champions” identified by those 
responsible for industrial policy in the 1980s, though they were not deliberately discriminated 
against by central or local government. These groups include firms such as: Changcheng 
(Great Wall) in IT; Mudan in Beijing, or Panda in the province of Jiangsu; TV Plant No. 1 for 
electrical appliances in Shanghai; Haier, Changhong, Konka in electrical appliances (Richet 
and Huchet, 2005); Stone and Legend (now Lenovo) in IT (Kennedy, 1997); Baosteel in steel 
(Steinfeld, 1998) or ZTE and Huawei in telecommunications (Ruscombe, 2007). But, these 
groups were also far from being supported financially and logistically in the same way as 
large state enterprises considered as a priority, and which dominated their sectors during the 
1980s. The very strong personalities of the leaders of these firms and the results obtained also 
led to a de facto privatisation of the management of these companies. Several case studies 
(Richet and Huchet, 2005) have shown that the leaders have gained their independence over 
almost all management decisions of the company (except for the sale or purchase of assets, 
for which regulators still retain a degree of control). Their independence also comes from 
their funding strategy. Having not benefited from the generosity of the State in the 1980s, the 
initial financing received from banks was used efficiently and the profits generated by 
business reinvested in relatively well-planned new investments, plus avoiding too great a 
dependency vis-à-vis the state banking sector. 
The results, however, were devastating for the companies that failed to adapt to competition, 
including large groups which were the priorities of industrial policy during the 1980s. With 
funding primarily based on bank lending, businesses that were unable to increase their market 
share very quickly found themselves unable to meet their repayments and had to borrow even 
more to continue to survive. In 1994, when the major reforms of the public sector were 
launched, these SOEs constituted a cohort of loss-making companies which were carried by 
the public banking sector and which the government was obliged to restructure or close in the 
second half of the 1990s. This shift from a market dominated by supply in the 1980s, to a 
market dominated by the demand in the early 1990s, with the introduction of competitive 
strategies by some companies, has been a very powerful factor in pushing forward the 
concentration of industry since 1997. 
 
2.3 The accumulation of technological capabilities 
The targets set by the Chinese government were to make up for the technological 
backwardness of Chinese firms relative to their foreign counterparts; to establish “national 
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champions” capable of innovation and able to compete with foreign firms and to achieve 
maximum technological autonomy in all branches of industry in order to reduce foreign 
dependence (and China's import bill). In the late 1990s, nearly 20 years after the launch of this 
policy, these objectives were still far from being achieved, despite some successes in some 
areas. China's failures, however, were not all useless. They were extensively analysed by the 
Chinese authorities, and helped modify the government's policy in the late 1990s. 
Concerning technology imports (excluding FDI), state enterprises have mostly focused on 
conventional technology transfers: licence purchases, purchases of production equipment with 
assistance from suppliers, purchases of turnkey factories and procurement of “turnkey-type” 
products. Without these imports of foreign technology, Chinese companies could not have 
overcome the many technological bottlenecks due to the isolation of the Maoist period. 
These imports were made at the cost of a huge waste of money and have been a means of 
survival and sustainability of largely inefficient firms in the public sector. Even though the 
size of the domestic market was propitious for the imperatives of economies of scale and 
scope, that are crucial in industry, it was not possible to achieve these because of the regional 
(or municipal) compartmentalisation of the administrative apparatus managing of public 
enterprises (Kang Chen, 1990). 
State-owned enterprises suffered badly from very rigidities of the socialist system: lack of 
decision-making autonomy in relation to the supervisory bureaucracies, foreign exchange 
rationing, inadequate incentive systems for managers and employees, serious deficiencies in 
the management and organisation (Simon 1991), the allocation of own resources of 
companies for the benefit of firms’ social services (the "iron rice bowl" in housing, hospitals, 
schools, health and retirement benefits) to the detriment of innovation (Geng Xiao, 1991), 
weak linkages with public R & D institutes and rigidities arising out of the administrative 
control of investment decisions. 
Thus, the assimilative capacity of foreign technology quite quickly became an important 
feature in discriminating state firms, as competition increased in the early 1990s. 
Success in the assimilation of foreign technology was a major element in the emergence of 
“new national champions”. But it was also important in the development of small firms in the 
collective and private sectors, which worked as subcontractors for leading public enterprises 
or foreign companies operating in China. Several field studies have shown that these 
companies have been able to assimilate foreign technologies: not only the hardware but also 
the softer parts of technology such as the organisation of work, the supply of spare parts and 
equipment repair (Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng, 1994). This openness and control of the 
black box of technology, has given them some form of independence from foreign suppliers 
in a context of shortage of foreign exchange, but also the ability to implement peripheral 
improvements, and over time to become gradually able to catch up with Western firms 
(Dalhman, Ross-Larson and Westphal, 1987). In some industries, it is precisely this type of 
technological capacity, acquired through the incremental improvement of foreign technology, 
that allowed Chinese companies to improve their competitiveness or to become world leaders. 
It is interesting to note that large parts of the industrial policy of the central government 
during the 1980s and early 1990s ultimately contributed very little to the technological 
success of the "new national champions" as well as the more dynamic collective and private 
firms. These firms were not priority actors supported by the State during the 1980s. The 
technological dynamism of a large share of these leading firms, which emerged in the mid-
1990s in the competitive sectors, did not owe much to aid from central government included 
in its industrial policy. It was not until the second half of the 1990s and especially the 2000s 
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that these firms were supported, but as part of a different strategic approach from that 
advocated by the State in the 1980s. 
Despite the failures and waste, certain aspects of Chinese government action had a positive 
effect on technological catch-up by the “new national champions”. Drawing on the lessons of 
centuries of industrial mercantilism, the Chinese authorities have pursued a policy of 
protecting the domestic market and the selective opening to foreign capital did foster the 
technological catch-up of a certain class firms. This policy was conducted in parallel with the 
gradual deregulation of the planned economy. 
 
2.4 The double-edged management of foreign capital 
The impact of the policy of opening the economy to foreign capital has generally been 
beneficial to Chinese industry. The selective management of foreign investment, with on the 
one hand, FDI for re-exports only, and on the other hand FDI to produce goods for sale on the 
domestic market, but supervised by JV contracts for leading technologies, had several positive 
consequences: 
- FDI for re-export, which was dominant until the mid-1990s by the Hong Kong and 
Taiwanese capital (nearly 3/4 of the total), was mainly located in the provinces of 
Guangdong, Fujian and Shanghai. Such investment allowed China to earn foreign exchange to 
finance purchases of foreign technology for Chinese companies. This FDI also contributed to 
create a set of small sub-contractors from the private and collective sectors. Often specialised 
by business, these formed a dense network of industrial partners, which were also in 
competition. Such outsourcing led to geographic specialisation with strong industrial districts 
that are among the most competitive in the world. 
- For FDI authorised to sell on to the domestic market, and which was selected on the basis of 
technology or type of product manufactured, its presence in China had two important 
technological consequences (apart from saving foreign exchange). The first, and not least, has 
been to allow the Chinese economy to benefit from products such as automobiles (the JV with 
Volkswagen), integrated circuits (the JVs with NEC and Motorola), digital telephone 
exchanges (the JV with Alcatel), nuclear power (Areva), that Chinese producers were unable 
to produce. Technology transfers within JVs have generally been quite satisfactory. These 
product areas have had significant ripple effects via productivity increases and improved 
infrastructure. The JV also helped train local subcontractors who, in many cases, after a few 
years, achieved commercial and technological autonomy to become globally competitive. The 
second, more indirect, consequence was the catalysing role played in the technological 
modernisation of Chinese enterprises in some sectors. JVs have been the undisputed 
technological leaders in many industrial sectors, and have pushed Chinese companies to pick 
up to speed in appropriating technology (Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng, 1994). Management 
by central government has avoided causing immediate, head-on shocks (of the type recorded 
in the former socialist countries following the sharp drop in tariffs after 1991) with Chinese 
firms, though the latter have still had to try to approach technological standards of JVs. 
In terms of strategic positioning in the value chain, more is known about the effects induced 
by this policy of openness. Chinese high-technology exports remain largely dominated by 
foreign-owned companies (nearly 80% of total) causing some crowding out of national 
producers in segments with higher value added. But even when Chinese producers dominate 
the industrial scene, their lack of visibility in terms of brand recognition and overseas 
marketing confines them to activities with very low profit margins. This hampers their ability 
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to finance technological upgrading. It is not surprising therefore to see that Chinese industrial 
firms subcontracting for European, American and Japanese multinationals express the desire 
to move up the value added chain, in order to capture a greater share of profits on sales to 
consumers in developed countries. To achieve this objective, the control of intermediate 
companies that operate in the field of distribution is crucial to Chinese firms. 
Finally, as far as the negative effects of the FDI strategy are concerned, it is worth mentioning 
that the best students leaving China's education system are attracted by foreign firms, thus 
limiting the impact of training on the human resources available to local industries run by 
large state firms. 
 
3. Towards Greater Realism... and Efficiency 
The late 1990s and early 2000s was marked by a progressive turnaround in the content and 
strategy of Chinese industrial policy. In some areas, such as the concentration and 
rationalisation of industrial structures, reform of national R & D, or the accumulation of 
technological capabilities, encouraging results emerged quite rapidly within a few years, 
portending to the greater effectiveness of industrial policy in the coming decades. 
 
3.1 A favourable economic and institutional environment 
The recent changes in industrial policy and the more encouraging results that have been 
recorded since the late 1990s are largely due to the positive results of the general reforms of 
the economy. 
The exit of socialism and the improvement of the functioning of the economy 
In terms of the functioning of the economic system, China has now largely exited socialism. 
Since 1994, planning mechanisms have been dismantled, as characterised by the deregulation 
of prices, supply and distribution. The reform introduced in the early 1980s, and which 
allowed businesses to sell any production exceeding planned quotas set by the State Planning 
Commission on the open market, gradually led to the complete disappearance of planning. 
Today, just over 90% of the retail prices in the industry and more than 80% of agricultural 
prices are set by the market. 
The financing channels of business investment have also been completely reformed. State 
banks benefited from the broad recapitalisation in 1998, at a total cost estimated at nearly 
$500 billion. 
Concerning property rights, the last decade has been marked by a strong diversification of 
ownership and a significant retreat of the State. For political reasons, the path was more 
tortuous than in other socialist countries. But since 1997, between 30,000 and 40,000 SMEs 
have been privatised out of a total of 126,000 state-owned enterprises in the industrial sector 
in 1996 (Huchet, 2006). The domestic private sector generates nearly a third of industrial 
production, and if foreign companies are included, private ownership in 2010 represented 
nearly 70% of the country's industrial production (World Bank, 2012). Such a review of all 
major operating mechanisms of socialist economies can be extended, leading to the 
conclusion that the Chinese economy exited the system in the early 2000s. 
The exit from of socialism has had a significant impact in terms of industrial policy 
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- The budget constraint on businesses has increased significantly to the point that it is now 
more and more difficult for companies that are leveraged to obtain bank loans to finance new 
investments. In parallel, banks have progressively improved their risk assessment of clients. 
Partial privatisation (stock market listing, capital entry by foreign banks) and the opening of 
banking to foreign banks since China's accession to the WTO, have increased pressure on 
both the State and banks, to improve the quality of their loan portfolios. These trends have led 
to further rationalisation of industries (via bankruptcies and mergers), promoting much faster 
concentration than existed in the 1980s and 1990s. 
- The emergence of new actors in the private sector has led to a diversification of firms 
assisted by industrial policy. The importance of the private sector in the economy is such that 
industrial policy no longer focuses exclusively on the public sector. The criteria for awarding 
aid are more transparent, and less dependent on the status of the property. These changes are 
more marked at the local levels of government, which seek primarily to promote the 
development of their local economies. 
- Regardless of their ownership status, companies are now subject to much less interference in 
their decisions about investment, financing, asset management or the management of their 
human resources. They are thus able to formulate strategies for developing their activities 
which are much more independent, and implement incentive policies best suited to their 
employees. State enterprises no longer have to fund social protection entirely, which means 
they have more resources for productive activities and innovation in particular. Generally, 
their capacity to respond to opportunities arising in the business environment has become 
much faster and wider in scope. In this context, the State has been encouraged to play a more 
indirect role in its aid to companies. 
 
3.2 Taxation has given the central government new room for manoeuvre  
One of the most positive aspects of the reforms implemented since 1994 lies in the significant 
increase in tax revenues of the State, both for central government but also in the richest 
coastal regions. The decentralisation of the 1980s and the structural decline in the profits of 
state enterprises, that used to be the only source of income for the State, both lead to a very 
serious erosion tax revenues for the Chinese State. It also led to an imbalance in favour of the 
provinces, at the expense of the central government. 
The major tax reform of 1994 and the various measures taken in the late 1990s concerning 
local finances (with control over extra-budgetary funds) have contributed – with the help of 
growth – to significantly improving the situation. The tax base of the State has been 
expanded, increasing sources of taxation. A better sharing of revenues between the centre and 
the provinces has been put in place, and most importantly, the State has managed to develop a 
tax administration that was largely deficient in the 1980s. 
In nearly a decade, the results of this reform have enabled the State to envisage more solid 
support in some areas of industrial policy. After an annual increase of about nearly 20%, total 
tax revenues in 2010 amounted to nearly 22% of GDP and the share of the central government 
accounted for just over 55% of the total, leading to a rapid rebalancing in favour of Beijing. 
Despite weaknesses (corruption, tax evasion, linkages with the lowest levels of government, 
regional disparities), the OECD predicts that the situation will continue to improve with the 
implementation of new reforms and the gradual modernisation the tax administration. 
This improvement in the tax situation has also had a major impact since the late 1990s on the 
financing of infrastructural projects (with expenditures increasing from an annual rate of 3% 
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of GDP in 1983 to just over 8% from 1998) and education. Significant improvements in these 
two areas have in turn had a positive impact on productivity in industry, the industrialisation 
of inland areas and, to some extent, on the conduct of industrial policy with a better educated 
elite working in government departments and agencies. 
Notable increases have occurred in R & D budgets since 1997: annual growth has been 
running at 19% (since 1995), to reach nearly $130 billion in 2011, or 1.83% of GDP, and the 
resulting proliferation of targeted programmes with better finance should continue with this 
improved tax situation.7 These developments should be more important in coastal areas, in 
which the greatest technological capabilities are concentrated.8 
 
3.3 Institutional reform 
In parallel to the exit from socialism and the improvement of the tax situation of the Chinese 
State, the last decade has been a period of intense reform of the institutions in charge of the 
economy. This has had a direct impact on industrial policy. Among the various reforms, we 
can select three, given their involvement in China's industrial policy: 
- Almost all the industrial ministries from the socialist system have been removed since 1997 
(with the number of ministries falling from of 40 to 29). State enterprises, especially larger 
ones, are no longer linked to a particular ministry but instead to the SASAC (State-Owned 
Asset Supervision Administration), which manages the assets of the State. In addition, the 
powerful former State Planning Commission has been transformed into a National 
Commission for Development and Reform (NDRC). 
- The reform of the management of public assets led to the creation of the SASAC in June 
2003. It is now the only entity within government to oversee and manage the portfolio of 
assets held by the State. This reform has led to a considerable clarifying of the skills needed in 
public asset management, not only within the central government, but also between Beijing 
and the large municipalities (Huchet, Stembridge and Fernandez, 2006). The SASAC directly 
manages nearly 130 of the largest public groups, with combined assets of almost $870 billion. 
Technically, the SASAC is also responsible for the assets of other state enterprises, but it has 
delegated responsibility for their management to local municipal commissions, which are 
under the authority of municipal governments. This reform has greatly reduced the sectoral 
compartmentalisation of the socialist system, which interfered in the conduct of industrial 
policy. 
- In the field of government management of the R & D system, several important changes 
have occurred since the late 1990s. The Group Leader Affairs Council (CHECK General 
Affairs Office) of State for Education and Technology was established in 1998. It aims to 
facilitate the coordination of technology policy throughout the country. Moreover, the former 
State Commission of Science and Technology was merged with the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST), which is the main ministerial body in charge of technology policy. 
 
3.4 Towards a new face of China's industrial policy 
The industrial policy of the Chinese State has been marked by three major developments since 
the early 2000s, and which are expected to strengthen in the years to come. We are witnessing 
																																								 																				
7 The Ministry of Science and Technology of the P. R. of China. 
8 Beijing, Shanghai and the province of Guangdong account for 40% of the country’s R & D spending. 
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a widening of the fields of action of industrial policy. On top of the existing, traditional areas 
of technological progress and the strengthening of the competitiveness of firms, these include: 
the decline in the energy intensity of industry; the fight against environmental degradation; 
and the promotion of industry in the interior regions of the west. These objectives have been 
presented as new priorities by the Chinese government. Otherwise, the action of the State’s 
industrial policy is less interventionist and less proactive than during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Finally, industrial policy affects all types of companies and not just public firms, while there 
is now greater transparency about the criteria for awarding financial aid from the State. 
In terms of restructuring and consolidation, the central government remains very active via 
the SASAC concerning the 150 largest companies in the country, but its action is no longer as 
dirigiste and proactive as it was in the 1980s and 1990s. Major restructuring in the monopoly 
sectors (energy, transport, telecommunications) already took place in the late 1990s. These 
large companies now have a wider range of action. Only large divestments or acquisitions of 
assets are still tightly controlled by the SASAC. 
For state enterprises at the local level, the reforms of the banking sector now limit the State’s 
role in subsidising loss-making SOEs with bank loans, as was the case throughout the 1980s 
and in the early 1990s. Finally, the demographic situation which was unfavourable in 1978 
has now changed considerably. The active population will start to decline in 2015 and while 
the investment multiplier generates less jobs, and migrant flows to cities of persons looking 
for work will continue to be significant until 2025, the situation is not as preoccupying as it 
was in the 1980s. The need to promote an industrial model which is labour intensive but low 
in profitability (with all the consequences this has in terms of bad debts in the banking sector) 
is gradually fading away. Even though China is still far from having the levels of the most 
advanced industrial economies, the concentration ratio is increasing slowly without the State 
having to intervene in the proactive and interventionist manner of the 1980s and 1990s. A 
certain form of dirigisme is likely to continue to express itself in the new fields of industrial 
policy on energy and the environment. After stating in the 11th (2006-2010) and the 12th Plan 
(2011-2015) that the decline in energy intensity and the fight against environmental 
degradation are priorities, the State is attempting to foster the closure of obsolete companies 
and technologies, and promote the concentration of production in larger firms in the name of 
energy intensity.9 
Strengthening the technological capacity of firms is also being addressed more indirectly than 
in the past. The State is focusing on building large research units working in basic research 
and leaving companies to be more independent. The latter now account for nearly two-thirds 
of R & D. Companies have accumulated technological skills that enable them today (unlike 
the 1980s) to open the "black box" of imported foreign technologies, to select better imports 
to be more independent of foreign technology. With the exception of monopolistic sectors, in 
which the Chinese government retains a capacity to intervene directly via public property, and 
in the setting of norms and standards, its action in other sectors is increasingly focused on 
improving the environment in which firms carry out their innovation efforts. 
 
Conclusion 
Chinese industrial policy has been marked over the past three decades by significant change, 
both in content and in its results. Until 1997, it was actually in areas in which the State wanted 
to be the most active and more proactive that it was the least effective in its actions, as 
																																								 																				
9	Report by the Prime Minister at the opening session of the National People’s Congress, 7 March 2008.	
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evidenced by the rather disappointing results in terms of the rationalisation of industrial 
structure and the creation of "national champions". The omnipotence of the Chinese State 
must therefore be qualified. Its ability to create strong firms commercially and technologically 
speaking was less than what other States were able to do in post-war Japan, or (South) Korea 
in the early 1960s. 
Since the late 1990s, the Chinese State’s industrial policy has evolved, and has indeed 
supported these developments. The State is gradually moving towards a more indirect form of 
intervention with the introduction today of more incentive policies to improve the 
environment in which companies operate. The restructuring of the public sector, banking 
sector reforms, lower trade barriers following the accession to the WTO in 2001, and the rapid 
development of the private sector have, within the space of a decade, drastically changed the 
environment of the industrial policy the Chinese authorities are implementing. Not only does 
the State no longer have all the levers to act proactively as it did during the 1980s and 1990s, 
but the Chinese government also appears to have largely learned the lessons of excessive 
dirigisme and proactive intervention. 
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